Não gosto de fazer postagens do tipo “clipping”, mas dada a absoluta carência de material de qualidade para se ler sobre a crise na Ucrânia, vou postar aqui os trechos iniciais de um artigo do diplomata português Francisco Seixas da Costa e de duas entrevistas publicadas na passada semana no Democracy Now:
Nós e a guerra que anda por aí
Por Francisco Seixas da Costa
O meu amigo JP Garcia “desafia-me” a escrever sobre o que se passa na Ucrânia. Que posso dizer que já não tenha aqui escrito, há semanas atrás? Nada do que está a passar-se me surpreende, desde a atitude russa à reação dita ocidental, com relevo para o esbracejar patético da Europa e o franzir de sobrolho do SG da NATO.
Se eu disser – como penso – que a UE está “a colher aquilo que plantou”, ao ter apoiado o derrube de um presidente legitimamente eleito e ter estimulado uma “escolha” estratégica por Kiev que um mínimo de razoabilidade política assumiria sempre como inviável, sem cuidar minimamente do estatuto das minorias russas (como também faz dolosamente em alguns Estados bálticos), serei considerado um “agente ao serviço de Moscovo”.
Se eu disser – como penso – que Putin mantém a tradicional estratégia de destabilização do “near abroad” ex- soviético, que passou já algumas “red lines” que justificam plenamente as sanções que a Rússia está a sofrer e que devem ser agravadas e que, com o seu comportamento dúplice, mostra que a Rússia deixou de ser um parceiro fiável e que é necessário rever rapidamente o conceito estratégico da NATO, para não deixar os acontecimentos correrem à vontade do seu autoritarismo, vou ser crismado de “agente do imperialismo americano”.
Now, this was a—you might say, a gentlemen’s agreement between Gorbachev and President Bush. It was one which was echoed by the other Western leaders—the British prime minister, the German chancellor, the French president. As we negotiated German unity, there the question was: Could a united Germany stay in NATO? At first, Gorbachev said, “No, if they unite, they have to leave NATO.” And we said, “Look, let them unite. Let them stay in NATO. But we will not extend NATO to the territory of East Germany.” Well, it turned out that legally you couldn’t do it that way, so in the final agreement it was that all of Germany would stay in NATO, but that the territory of East Germany would be special, in that there would be no foreign troops—that is, no non-German troops—and no nuclear weapons. Now, later—at that time, the Warsaw Pact was still in place. We weren’t talking about eastern Europe. But the statements made were very general. At one point, Secretary Baker told Gorbachev NATO jurisdiction would not move one inch to the east. Well, he had the GDR in mind, but that’s not what he said specifically.
So, yes, if I had been asked when I was ambassador of the United States in Moscow in 1991, “Is there an understanding that NATO won’t move to the east?” I would have said, “Yes, there is.” However, it was not a legal commitment, and one could say that once the Soviet Union collapsed, any agreement then maybe didn’t hold, except that when you think about it, if there was no reason to expand NATO when the Soviet Union existed, there was even less reason when the Soviet Union collapsed and you were talking about Russia. And the reason many of us—myself, George Kennan, many of us—argued against NATO expansion in the ’90s was precisely to avoid the sort of situation we have today. It was totally predictable. If we start expanding NATO, as we get closer to the Russian border, they are going to consider this a hostile act. And at some point, they will draw a line, and they will do anything within their power to keep it from going any further. That’s what we’re seeing today.
Well, we have to ask ourselves, because we don’t fully know, because Obama is a kind of aloof figure who disappears in moments like this, then reappears and says kind of ignomatic things. But are we being drawn into it, or are we driving these events? It has been true, ever since NATO was created, that the United States controlled NATO. Now, it is also true now that there—that NATO is deeply divided on the Ukrainian issue. There’s a war party. And the war party is led by Poland, the three Baltic states, to a certain extent Romania but not so much, and Britain. Then there’s a party that wants to accommodate Russia, that thinks that this is not entirely Russia’s fault. And moreover, these people—the Germans, the French, the Spanish, the Italians—depend on Russia, in many ways, for their economic prosperity. They want to negotiate, not punish Russia. Where is Obama in this? It would appear nowhere, except occasionally he comes in, as he did in Estonia—was it yesterday or the day before?—and seem to give a speech that favors the war party.